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Abstract:   Sadly, all the efforts of a generation of Australian men and women have only made them 
more indebted to the rest of the world. Australia’s external net wealth is negative, soon 
passing minus $900b on an accelerating downward trajectory. This ongoing dissipation 
of national resources is unsustainable. Australians live in a debt dreamtime, one from 
which the rest of the world has been rudely awakened. After years of inadequate 
policies, the nation has a large external debt and significant government exposures. 
Servicing pressures are growing as rising uncertainties permeate global credit markets. 
Reserve  Bank  policies  are  worsening Australia’s  external  position  and  needlessly 
driving up internal costs. Major policy rethinking is warranted. Relevant issues are still 
little considered, crowded out of dialogues by comforting myths that accompany the 
Australian Debt Dreamtime. Imbalances need proper recognition with new approaches 
and strategies developed. Automatic corrections will not occur as history and current 
overseas experiences demonstrate. A real awakening, improved positioning and a touch 
of luck are required if Australians are to avoid being seriously impoverished by world 
events and their own confused Dreaming. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal in this paper is to explore several worsening imbalances that threaten Australian 
prosperity. Rising problems have gone addressed because current preferences ignore them. 
Australians and their policy makers need to wake from their economic and financial dreams 
before they stumble into an economic crisis.
1.1 A new Dreamtime?
The Dreamtime is an ever-present time of Dreaming wherein Aboriginal people in Australia 
believe the world and its creatures were created and are renewed. The many sacred tales were bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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passed on by word of mouth to those deemed able to act responsibly1. Today, some are read 
as tales for children. 
‘One day a bat named Kunbul was sitting alone by his fire in the bush. Two flying foxes saw his 
smoke and decided to join him… When Warlet and Ninji sat down, Kunbul thought they smelt bad 
… [and] sneezed “You fellas don’t smell right to me.” …’
‘Warlet and Ninji were shocked by Kunbul’s bad manners. They thought everyone smelt the same, 
you see. They didn’t like being told that they were different. So they decided to tell their father, old 
Kul-man-gut the Rainbow Serpent. …’ (Cowan 2000)
The Rainbow Serpent agrees Kunbul is to be “taught a lesson’ and he intervenes in ensuing 
battles, with consequences for both sides. Both sides find their liberties constrained, the bats being 
made to inhabit dark caves and the flying foxes the marshes. None are to fly in the light of day.
The Debt Dreamtime is more modern. This Dreaming offered a common creation myth 
of innovative finance and efficient markets creating a prosperous world. Sophisticated tales 
of many types were passed on widely and indiscriminately. “This time is different” (Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009) was the cry used to quieten the skeptic, a cry used many times historically 
in the prelude to crises. 
Many acted incautiously. Indeed, whole tribes, companies and nations adventurously 
embraced investments devoid of familiar features or safe recourse. Reports from the markets 
were exciting, and overblown. Risks remained unappreciated. In the Debt Dreaming of 
Australians, many considered themselves good investors yet two-thirds did not consider risk 
and return (anon citing Australian Government Financial Literacy Foundation 2007). 
When a modern Kunbul ventured “You fellas don’t smell right to me”, the flying foxes 
reacted with opprobrium and again enlisted supernatural aid. Select “economic” papers and 
opinions hurled by high flying foxes now replaced the spears that rained down in previous 
Dreamings to teach Kunbul a lesson.
It takes a powerful creation myth to alter the views of a generation. Modern myths of 
markets and globalization are powerful, and those who question such myths need to provide 
not just facts but a more appealing myth if proper resolutions are to be achieved. Such are the 
challenges in moving beyond the current Debt Dreamtime and the world so created. 
Empirical and schematic analysis is used to outline some key external and internal stresses. 
These are exacerbated by current policies. The positions of Australia will only be improved 
by refreshed thinking, more sensitive policies and apt interventions. Whether crises might 
eventuate is an open and real issue. 
The influence of high interest rates is particularly important, and destructive in several 
areas. Monetary policies focused on inflation that indiscriminately set a high price for money 
needed to be discarded in the move from a closed to an open economy. They were not, and the 
burgeoning carry trade in currencies is but one result. Policies more attuned to the possibilities 
of an open economy were needed last century, before imbalances grew so pronounced.
1  The tale used allegorically here was related by Kianoo Tjeemairee of the Murrinpatha people in today’s 
Northern Territory (Robinson 1968). Like Aesop’s fables and like moral tales it involves animal characters 
with human traits. A bat and two flying foxes cannot resolve a lack of understanding themselves so it becomes 
a dispute to be settled by their common father and creation spirit. This serpent of many hues is powerful and 
often unpredictable. mArk mcgoVErn
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The broader issue is one of allocation. Misallocations of funds are now manifest in a 
heavily encumbered economy and in major external liabilities. These will not be rectified by 
even the most bountiful minerals boom. It was foolish to put “all the national eggs” in one 
ore basket. Current exposures set a precursor to crisis, with triggers already setting. Options 
from outside the current mind set need to be adopted to defuse current threats. A crisis does 
not arise without some serious misspecifications being commonly incorporated into thinking 
and policies. Misspecifications and imbalances inherent in the Australian Debt Dreamtime 
need to be redressed, now. 
A paper such as this can only offer some explorations of what is a very complex area. 
The scope is wide in an effort to show little-appreciated interconnections and to stimulate 
dialogues and actions. Some depth is necessarily sacrificed, as it will be in any such sketch, 
but we cannot sit idly waiting for a full resurvey of the area. Continuing uncritically with 
ideas, methods and understandings that have been part of the genesis of serious exposures is 
not a sensible option. Windows of opportunity still remain but they are closing, quickly now 
given EU events. Rectifications will only become more difficult as crises deepen elsewhere.
How Australia’s external imbalances are worsening and stresses rising are discussed in 
empirical and conceptual analysis of the international accounts in Section II. The roles of 
interest rates and key limitations on Australian monetary policies are the focus of Section III. 
Monetary policies are delivering perverse outcomes, including for Australian governments 
(Section IV). Servicing rising common obligations held as debt and bonds will be increasingly 
difficult unless external rebalancing and monetary rectifications occur. 
II. IMBALANCES AND STRESS
2.1 What the Numbers Reveal
If Kunbul were to visit Australia today he may well be perplexed by what he observes in 
“the lucky country”. Different tribes wander the land proclaiming how good things are, yet 
insights gleaned from his vantage suggest that things are very different, or may be so soon. 
The statistics for Australia do reveal, amongst other things, that:
•  expenditures exceed product which exceeds income
•  debts which fund the gaps are growing apace
•  a sizeable source of funding lies beyond Australian shores
•  real interest rates and the interest burden on households are historically very high 
•  infrastructure funding conditions are the most adverse they have been since the 
Federation began
•  even some banks are finding funding most difficult. 
Kunbul holds a simple ethos: if you take more than you give you will need to change something 
sometime, else you risk everything. Maintaining due balances was always important in the 
harsh Australian clime. When he told the flying foxes who arrived uninvited into his camp that 
they didn’t “smell right”, it had been the truth. His motivation seems sourced in concern for 
their well being. Yet they took affront and went off to that treacherous serpent who ultimately 
banished them all from the light of day.bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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Today things seem different, but are they? Across the lands many imbalances are evident. 
How do those in Australia continue to spend more of their sacred “monies” than they earn, 
still obtain credit and attract ever more monies from over the seas? To Kunbul, this just does 
not “smell right”. Still a whole generation seems to have lived this way, in a Dreaming that 
simple bats struggle to understand.
The net external wealth of Australia has deteriorated across the generation (McGovern 
2010b, from which Figure 1 is drawn). Calculation of external wealth is based upon cumulative 
financial surpluses from an essentially zero basis in 1960. As is evident, Australia has been 
increasingly building external liabilities. A particularly marked decline has occurred over the 
last decade resulting in a total external exposure of $820b as at June 2010 with an annual 
deterioration of over $50b. 
Figure 1: “Earned” External Wealth Changes, Australia 1960 to 2010
Such calculations are naïve in that they do not allow for revisions due to the cumulative 
effects of exchange rate influences, investment performances, asset or liability writedowns and the 
like. McGovern (2010a, Table 2) using Reserve Bank of Australia (2010) notes total Australian 
net foreign liabilities of $764b which is mainly net debt of $672b held principally by financial 
corporations ($405b or 53% of liabilities) and non-financial corporations ($159b or 21%) as well 
as an unitemised external debt liability of $109b (14%). Net equity liabilities were $92b (12%).
Comparing the two aggregates shows only a $56b difference, a relatively slight variation 
(7%) given recent circumstances including foreign exchange movements. Current strategies 
are not working. So far at least, Australian funds going overseas have not notably outperformed 
those staying in Australia. Inward investments and related exports are not rectifying the 
Australian situation. Further research is warranted into the relative returns from investments 
made in Australia and externally as well as their risk profiles. 
The central conclusion is stark: all the efforts of a generation of Australian men and women 
have only made them more obligated to the rest of the world. All that reform, all those industry 








































































































of a previous boom in mining – all have come to naught. Today, we stride the world stage 
with external debts and other net liabilities above seventy percent of GDP, and increasing. 
Unaddressed, this is a precursor for crisis as is next discussed. How this situation might have 
come about is then considered. Finally the (growing) obligations of governments are detailed.
2.2 Incipient Crisis or Ongoing Dissipation?
The declining external wealth of Australia reflects high and rising external liabilities of various 
types. The ability to meet such liabilities becomes increasingly doubtful as they rise in value 
as a proportion of GDP. However, size alone is an inadequate guide to prospects.
Manasse and Roubini (2005) empirically explore past crisis experiences to investigate 
“the set of economic and political conditions that are associated with a likely occurrence of a 
sovereign debt crisis”. They derive rules of thumb for likely default. Their schema is applied 
to Australia as shown in Figure 2. Importantly, Australian external obligations are largely 
 
Figure 2: “Rules of Thumb” on the Roads to Sovereign Crisis
Source: Adapted from Manasse and Roubini (2005). Note there are alternate paths not here explored.bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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held privately so at face value the sovereign appears little exposed externally. Importantly 
also, these are held in Australian dollars. However, the sheer bulk of obligations held by 
banks deemed “too big to fail” in the Australian context, the sizeable Commonwealth, State 
and local government debts (Section IV), the uncertainties of currency regimes, the indirect 
sourcing of some monies and the existence of various guarantees and understandings drive 
de facto and potential de jure exposures. 
It is just this uncertainty about “who bears which risks” and “who guarantees whom” that 
has made resolution of existing crises so difficult, and the escalation of some crises so rapid 
and devastating. Just ask the Indonesians, Icelanders, Irish and Italians – amongst many. In 
the long history of defaults, there were 48 sovereign defaults between 1976 and 1989 and 16 
more from 1998 to 2002 (Feenstra and Taylor 2011, p. 864) but virtually none between 1950 
and 1970. Kunbul is very curious.
From this perspective the Australian governments are currently not crisis prone. They 
do have three vulnerabilities. External financing and public external debt to revenue ratios 
currently appear well under posited trigger points but this could change rapidly with adverse 
global conditions, unsupportable interest positions or local bank fund-raising failures. More 
directly, sovereign crisis risk tops 66 percent if inflation were to revisit the levels of the 
1970s. While the Reserve Bank may stand ready with “interest rate management” the world 
has changed since earlier times. In an open economy raising interest rates may exacerbate 
current  account  problems  and  damage  the  ability  to  make  due  payments  (Section  III).   
Importantly, no consideration is given here of currency crises or banking (system) crises. These 
are areas of risk also, and one can lead to another. While any talk of a triple crisis for Australia 
is premature, suitable analysis should be part of any strategic policy development. Events in 
Europe have shown how quickly and broadly crises can build. It was only two years ago that 
the European Commission praised Italy, including its “greater resilience to external shocks”. 
Now Italy is under administration with no politician in the new cabinet (Squires 2011) as, in 
PM Monti’s words, this “will remove one ground for disagreement”. How the government 
of Italy is for Italy will be revealed in the days to come. There is much to ponder in current 
developments, and lessons for Australia.
The essential issue is when will lenders stop lending. The long run borrowing constraint 
(LRBC) relates how anticipated revenue flows need to cover debt servicing and other obligations. 
This can be applied to firms, households, governments and nations with forfeiture of some 
held wealth or default argued when servicing revenues are inadequate or perceived to be such. 
The addition of “risk premiums” can rapidly turn such a perception into a reality. Further 
discussions must wait for another place.
2.3 The Australian External Imbalances of Payments
Credit is needed if expenditures exceed incomes. Australian expenditures markedly exceed 
incomes, currently by about $50b every year. Credit has been sourced, nationally and externally, 
to maintain such an imbalance in Australia for a generation. Full empirical details are provided 
in McGovern (2010b). 
In terms of the national external accounts (ABS 2010; Feenstra and Taylor 2011), the mArk mcgoVErn
175
pattern is built on linking aggregate product, income, disposable income and expenditure. In a 
closed economy these must, by definition, be equal. This need not be so in an open economy, 
and Australia has been spending more than its income for years. Specifically, GNE > GDP > 
GNDI. Expenditure exceeds product which exceeds income. 
Linkage is via external accounts. Four principal aggregates are linked via five sets of 
external transactors (Figure 3). External balances struck involve net:
•  trade, being product exports less imports;
•  factor income, being the net current returns to “offshore” factors such as labour (as 
wages eg), capital (dividends) and monies (interest);
•  unrequited transfers, being transfers made with no expectation of accountable return; 
•  capital items, being ownership of some (now restricted) capital types; and
•  fund positions, being both monies and claims allocated via debt and other funding 
arrangements and (many) ownership claims.
Figure 3: Basic External Account Structure
Sources: Developed from ABS (2010) figures and Feenstra and Taylor (2011).bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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The first three comprise the Current Account (CA) and represent transactions associated with 
activities in the year (or quarter) of account. The Current Account links National Expenditures 
to Disposable Incomes (via Domestic Prooduction). The fourth and fifth are a small Capital 
Account (KA) and a generally larger Financial Account (FA). The growth in the last reflects 
both the internationalisation of investments and the provision of credits to fund expenditures 
in excess of disposable income. Kunbul would be sniffing the air.
The focus here is on the key patterns. Figures provided for Australia are for a notional year 
around 2007, before fluctuations from GFC impacts. They approximate the situation then but 
require further explications and revisions which will be reported further. Still, the essential 
situation remains. Conveniently, disposable income at $1000 billion simplifies percentage 
calculations, with net factor outflows (including considerable interest payments) above four 
percent of income and an income shortfall of just under six percent. 
Kunbul may well say “You number fellas don’t smell right.” Around ten percent of current 
income is now allocated to “just keeping going” given the divergences between aggregate 
income and expenditure in the current period and the (accumulated) past. Of course the 
argument offered by many is that this reflects “past investments” which will pay off. However, 
the stunning thing about Australian External Wealth (Figure 1) is that we have now being 
waiting for some thirty year for payoffs from hosting visiting funds and investments yet the 
position is, if anything, deteriorating more rapidly. More tellingly, the most optimistic figures 
about the current boom do not adequately address Australia’s External Wealth/Obligations 
problem. Other adjustments will be needed. Serious policy renewal is needed. Dreaming 
of resurrecting Doha2 or of Trans-Pacific Partnerships3 introduces nothing new, and some 
fundamental changes are now of the essence. While political exaggerations from “delighted” 
and “excited” Ministers are understandable, the proper response by the governments of Australia 
is to demonstrate how mooted changes will be good for Australia, specifically in rectifying 
Australian external imbalances.
Put bluntly, Australia’s external position deteriorated as trade liberalisation advanced so 
any net opportunities that may have been on offer were not realised. Why should the impacts 
of any further liberalisations been any different? When Finance Ministers agree that across 
APEC “growth and job creation have weakened, inflation remains elevated [and] Capital flow 
volatility has intensified in response to heightened risk aversion” (APEC 2011), proponents 
need to demonstrate with convincing evidence how proposals will reduce risks and rectify 
problems in the current environment and going forward. More of the same is not an answer.
Recapping, expenditure can exceed product which can exceed income in an open economy 
while credit funds are made available. The sum of the three external accounts is zero: 
CA+KA+FA=0. For an externally unbalanced economy like Australia, excess expenditures 
(CA deficit) is balanced by external credits (FA surplus). Aggregate numbers in Figures 3 
2  “Keeping alive the Doha Round, and agreeing innovative ways to deliver on issues such as trade facilitation, 
will help the world get through current economic uncertainty” said Trade Minister Craig Emerson Swire, M. 
(2011). Australia Urges Global Rethink Of Doha Agenda. Tax News. Hong Kong.
3  “I‘ve said consistently to Australians that trade equals jobs,” Ms Gillard said after the TPP meeting. ”We are 
a great trading nation and anything we can do to increase our capacity to trade is good for Australian jobs. 
… There is a great deal of ambition and scope in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Gartrell, A. (2011). APEC 
leaders agree on trade deal outline AAP.mArk mcgoVErn
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and 4 are net. Inflows less Outflows of monies associated with some base transfer (such 
as product movements) net to the balances shown. So negative balances are net outflows. 
The balances can be from much larger flows (as in product or merchandise trade where a 
net $-11b is associated with exports and imports of over $230b in each direction), or they 
may be at around fifty percent of outflows (as with factor incomes). Such details will not 
be considered further here but balance composition is important when considering potential 
influences and responses. 
As an example, slowing overseas demand and stable domestic demand may see a worsening 
of the balance of trade even with growth in exports. This could be especially pronounced if 
overseas producers offer “credit on easy terms” to finance the continuance of exports from 
their production bases by drawing down on their accumulated national surpluses. The extent 
of price pass through when exchange rates vary is another issue that can lead to significant 
asymmetries in responses in constituent flows to changing conditions. Adjustments anticipated 
in theory may not be as quick or simple in practice, especially when significant investments-
in-place rely upon continuance of product and associated revenue flows.
If investments work out “as expected” then obligations are met. It consumption expenditures 
on credit can be well met by future incomes then the loan is repaid. If not, defaults occur, be 
they private, corporate, banking, State or sovereign. Australia is a heavily obligated nation 
facing adverse external economic weather. Australians would be well advised to develop 
alternate plans in case:
•  revenues falter at just the wrong times, particularly those from trade, taxation or labour;
•  the general costs of external funding rise, rapidly or slowly; 
•  a risk premium becomes associated with AUD borrowings, either due to currency 
instabilities or a perception of approaching LRBC issues;
•  a capital ‘stop’ occurs with (rollover or new) funds simply not available under global, 
specific or targeted capital rationing;
•  a capital flight occurs (globally or locally) with funds repatriated to home countries 
or safe havens; or
•  some other situation arises that causes an urgent need to rectify Australian external 
imbalances. 
Lenders who wish to be paid “in a hurry” can exact harsh terms. It would also be needlessly 
tragic if, in a scramble, debts were refinanced in US dollars terms to take account of a short-lived 
interest rate differential or liquidity option which was then followed by a marked depreciation 
of the Australian Dollar. 
Introduced in Figure 4 is an elaboration of the gap between income and expenditure as well 
as some considerations of both contexts and interaction areas. Not only are more possibilities 
now evident, the existence of alternative pathways allows alternative strategies for bridging 
the gap between income and expenditure. It was in just this area that much innovative finance, 
speculative dreaming, ineffective regulation and “weird” accounting occurred. The Global 
Financial Crisis, amongst others, is rooted here. Kunbul was right? While much can be said 
in this area we will simply note linkages can be many and varied, specifically those involving 
interest rates in their various roles.bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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Figure 4: Entity Aggregates and External Flows
 mArk mcgoVErn
179
III. INTEREST, GROWTH AND BALANCES
Interest rates can affect investment, growth rates, disposable incomes, foreign exchange rates 
and economic circumstances more generally. High household debt sees Australians currently 
paying around ten per cent of disposable income to cover the interest payments needed at 
current high rates. At the same time, the Federal government seeks to stimulate a potentially 
stumbling  economy  while  States  stimulate  with  expensive  infrastructure.  Kunbul  hangs 
bemused. No one seems to question why such high real interest rates remain deliberate policy.
3.1 When Interest Rates are High, and Exceed Growth Rates
Australians have been paying historically high real interest rates for some decades now. The 
interest-only component of a 30-year loan has been steadily rising, from zero in real terms for 
loans terminating around 1980 to five-and-a-half percent for those terminating today (McGovern 
2010a). Meanwhile, real growth rates in Australia and around the world have been declining. 
Such a divergence in trends between interest rate and growth rates is hostile to investment. 
Not only is there a lower level of overall investment required at a lower rate than at a higher 
one, the returns on investment actually made need to be notably above the growth rate. A 
five percent real interest rate in an economy growing at three percent sees investors with the 
“average” real economy return falling behind by two percent each year. Redistributions occur. 
Investments that return at the real economic growth rate simply do not “keep up”. Inflation 
may add distortions but it does not change the “real” underlying, downwards driver. 
In considering indicators of fiscal sustainability, Flassbeck and Panizza (2008) state a 
“common rule of thumb” as:
Δd = (r – g) d – ps, where
  d is the debt to GDP ratio
  r is the steady state real interest rate
  g is the long run growth rate of real GDP
  ps is the primary surplus to GDP 
While this is developed in the context of the public sector, it appears more generally applicable. 
Applied naively to the Australian net external position (by setting r=0.05 and g=0.03) 
we find an annual change in debt to GDP of around two percent of the opening ratio less any 
primary surplus. So in the absence of any current account surplus, debt to GDP would be 
rising each year by in excess of 1.5 percent (d=0.70 times r-g =0.2). This is on the existing 
debt, reflecting a failure to service it adequately. We also need to add on increases in principal 
as Australia borrows around five percent of GDP to maintain expenditures. Kunbul doubts 
the “sustainability” of the current position, but he is just a bat using some simple calculations 
(that are more usually applied in the developing country context).
Arguably, in recent decades the reliance on interest rate movements in inflation targeting 
along with an insensitive allocation of rates across investment classes have compounded problems 
and raised investment risk while doing little for inflation objectives. Clearly this challenges 
current conventions in Australia, and elsewhere, but an argument needs to be had. Reserve bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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Bank of Australia decisions of interest rates may be well be worsening not only Australian 
competitiveness (since investment becomes markedly more expensive and unattractive as next 
discussed) but also its external position (as then discussed).
The historical experience, including as reflected in Figure 5, offers at best mixed support 
to those arguing that interest rates effectively influence inflation. Further, the interest rate 
spread rose to over four percent in the early 1980s and remained around five percent until the 
initial onset of the Global Financial Crisis. A similar spread now was then largely restored 
before contracting recently. Such spreads need to be fully explained and markedly reduced. 
Figure 5: Interest Rates and Inflation, Australia 1960 to 2010
High Australian interest rates also impact on Australia via the carry trade. While the 
potential profits from this are recognised (making even the textbooks, Feenstra and Taylor 
2008), the impacts on domestic monies are less appreciated. Monies that flow into a nation’s 
currency pool may well be utilised within the nation by eager lenders sitting on these substantial 
deposits. We simply need to “join some boxes” in the top left of Figure 4 and there is a marked 
and little monitored (let alone regulated) increase in the quantity of money in circulation. It 
is then but a short step to an asset bubble, particularly in investments such as housing which 
are deemed “prime” by distant institutions. 
Kunbul reads often that there is no housing bubble in his homeland but he has long 
wondered how even the Rainbow Serpent could recover the funds on issue. From a different 
empirical perspective, sovereign yield curves show Australia paying an interest rate at least 
1.5 percent higher than key developed nations for longer terms and around 3 percent higher 
at the shorter end (Australian Office of Financial Management 2010b). How does Australia 
afford or warrant such an imbalance?
 mArk mcgoVErn
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3.2 Investment – in Production and Portfolio Cycles
It is at this point that, following Minsky (2008 /1975, 92-104), we may link to the distinction 
by Keynes between:
•  a “prospective yield on investment” in production regarded as a series of annuities Qi 
(i=1..n) arising from the physical output produced (within a cyclical framework with 
varyingly scarce Capital allowing quasi-rents), and 
•  those returns qi (i=1..n) from a portfolio of financial assets with the real interest rate 
playing a pivotal role.
Real investment requires investor preference for the Qi over the qi. Decisions will be cast 
within some evaluative framework where various estimates and attributions are made to give 
some comfort or confidence about a decision for which at least some of the consequences 
remain inherently unknowable. 
From a complementary perspective, consider the debt funding of investments that have 
a delayed cash flow. Infrastructure investments such as the building of a dam “suffer” from 
such a timing mismatch. Costs “up front” are supposed to be serviced from “later” returns. In 
the case of a dam, for example, essentially all costs must be met up front yet full utilisation 
and a strong revenue stream may take half a century or more. Infrastructure investments in 
particular highlight a long-lived life cycle for the production-base established by the investment. 
Three cycles that can then be discerned are those of the:
•  quasi-rents, where the actions of competing investors matter;
•  financial portfolio mix, where the interest rate particularly matters;
•  production base established, where the design specifics matter.
All will have historical presences. All such cycles historically provide relatively good and 
bad times to act and invest. 
Illustrative calculations using historical real interest rates for Australia since Federation 
in 1901 show very different payments to the lender and returns to the borrower for a 30 year 
loan on the same illustrative revenue stream (McGovern 2011). Indeed, the experience for 
1980 investments terminating in 2010 was the most adverse of any since Federation, closely 
matching that running 1925 to 1955 but markedly inferior to those commencing in most other 
years including 1970. 
The simple lesson is that conditions can change drastically in the space of a decade with 
a previously very attractive investment returning very poorly if initiated ten years later. The 
further lesson is that a variable interest rate environment imposes largely unmanageable risks 
on long-term investments and can make the prospective yield on a real investment even more 
uncertain.
Links back to the external accounts can appear from the relatively unattractive investment 
clime in Australia that has been sketched. A link that appears unappreciated is that high domestic 
interest rates may compound current account problems. The argument is next explored, from 
two main directions. bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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3.3 Inflation Targeting in an Open Economy
The largely unquestioned use of variations in interest rates as a policy tool is now questioned. 
It has always struck Kunbul as peculiar that long-term agreements between two parties could 
be set in so many ways but costs imposed on one party could be allowed to fluctuate according 
to the short-term needs of a second and third party. But Kunbul is but a bat. 
Four of the lines of challenge involve:
•  logic and design issues,
•  institutional arrangements,
•  effects on project risks and capital accumulation,
•  effects in the national external accounts.
Only the fourth is addressed here. The essential question is “could high interest rates exacerbate 
external exposures?” The answer is “Yes”. This can be demonstrated through modeling and 
more theoretical considerations.
 “in standard open macro models with incomplete information, monetary policy geared towards price 
stability may result in (rather than correcting) misalignments in important asset prices like the exchange 
rate, even when the latter only reflects fundamental-based valuation. … A comparatively small number 
of contributions have looked at the implications for monetary policy of misalignments that arise from 
the dual role of the exchange rate in goods and asset markets.” (Corsetti, Dedola et al. 2009)
That is, monetary policy may misalign exchange rates further and few macro-analysts consider 
asset market implications of monetary policy.
While the modeling reported is preliminary it has significant implications. The study 
recognizes that monetary policy effects vary depending on relatively high or relatively low 
trade [price] elasticity and whether export prices are sticky in the source (PCP) or destination 
(LCP) nation, as summarized in Table 1. In evaluating monetary policy it is then not just an 
issue of generic “openness” but of trade elasticities and where price stickiness occurs. Kunbul 
wonders which box Australia is in, and where its central bank thinks it is.
 
Export pricing stickiness  Under optimal 
monetary policy   in origin  in destination 
 
trade elasticity 
PCP (producer country 
pricing) 




price stability (PS) 
goal 
allocation is close to that 
for... domestic 
production price stability 
allocation is close to that 
for... domestic CPI 
stability 
PS brought about at the cost of not 
redressing exchange rate misalignment, 
but limited consumption and employment 
impacts 
relatively low 
price stability (PS) 
goal 
misalignments are sizeable (and of wrong sign) with 
large deviations from optimality domestically and 
across countries 
perverse trade flows and large 
consumption and employment impacts 
relatively low 
Ramsay policy goal 
improvement over PS   significant improvement 
over PS  
better external orientation at the cost of 
domestic price stability 
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The key point is that seeking price stability through “optimal” monetary policy may result in 
significant misalignments and perverse impacts. It may be better to “lean against the currency” 
rather than “raise interest rates”. The practical distinction between currency “leaning” and 
“management” is unclear so while there may appear to be an alternative its viability may be 
practically limited and speculative.
It is important to recognize that “optimal” is here defined in terms of current (global) 
markets and not in terms of national external imbalances. So even a more sensitive, broader 
monetary approach may not improve the external position of Australia or others with large 
external liabilities.
A more telling analysis is offered in Arize, Bonitis et al. (2000) who explicitly address 
alternative theoretical frameworks used to consider balance of payments adjustments. 
”The monetary theory does contain some elements of truth which the Absorption [Traditional or 
Keynesian] theory bypasses (and vice versa). … The basic question concerns the value of the two 
theories in explaining the elimination of a deficit.” (Gray 2000)
Gray finds both deficient but each may be potentially useful. Portfolio balances provides an 
alternative focus. Each approach strikes a different stance and focus.
The monetarists “look upon the current account, the capital account and the official reserve 
transactions as the main components of the balance of payments” while the Keynesians focus 
on goods and services. (Johnson, Kasibhatla et al. 2000). 
“An important major shortcoming of the Traditional approach is that it only discusses, in its 
attempt to explain external disequilibria, intermediate parameters such as relative incomes, prices 
and interest rates, and not the causal root parameters… [it] looks at the vehicles of transmission of 
disturbances, not their causal parameters.” (Bonitsis and Malindretus 2000)
Of immediate interest in terms of interest rate effects is that the Traditional approach sees a 
raising of interest rates as curbing external current account deficits while the Monetary approach 
sees the opposite. Thus “traditionalists” see Australia’s external problems as being improved 
by raising interest rates while “monetarists” see them as being worsened. 
The possibility that actions by the Reserve Bank in Australia may be worsening the external 
situation in a variety of ways needs to be investigated further. This brief commentary has 
highlighted some of the lines of investigation that appear relevant. A country may be facing 
a disequilibrium for a variety of reasons and there appear to be no compelling a priori or 
empirical reasons to expect these to self correct. Clearly, policies in this area need thorough 
review and justification as to adequacy and effectiveness in the circumstances that Australia with 
its unbalanced accounts faces. Continuing policies that have accompanied an ever-worsening 
external situation is not a sensible option.
IV. THE SITUATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS
4.1 Empirical Financial Situation of the States and Commonwealth
It is fascinating that Government financial situations were not assessed in either Henry (2010) 
or in the lead up to the Tax Forum (Commonwealth Treasury 2011). Instead the focus has 
essentially settled on who to tax more, and the purported efficiencies of different ways to do it. bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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Why there is a need for governments to raise more tax goes unaddressed, as do other relevant 
considerations. Such myopia appears to be risky and, probably, dangerous. 
The assets and liabilities of the Australian governments are shown in Table 2. Numbers 
are drawn from the various statements of each of the States and the Commonwealth as at June 
30th 2010 (Australian Office of Financial Management 2010a; Northern Territory Treasury 
Corporation 2010; NSW Treasury Corporation 2010; Queensland Treasury Corporation 2010; 
South Australia Treasury 2010; Tasmania Department of Treasury and Finance 2010; Western 
Australian Treasury Corporation 2010; Treasury Corporation of Victoria 2011). Differences in 
reporting practices lie behind the unevenly reported italicized sections and Notes which should 
be regarded as subject to revision, including as regards “unclear” superannuation exposures 
(Mayne 2010, Kohler 2011). 
Table 2: Assets and Liabilities of the Australian GovernmentsmArk mcgoVErn
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The Commonwealth has a stated net exposure of $124b as at June 30 2010 (with an 
additional $67b in liabilities taken on in the following year). The States generally appear close 
to financial balance. However, those States using Treasury Corporation are on-lending to 
their various agencies with high interest repayments expected in return. Rising utility service 
prices, for example, appear influenced by high bond servicing costs, an issue not commonly 
recognized. Inflationary effects result.
Again these figures need further elaboration but observations include:
•  the singularly high net exposure of the Commonwealth;
•  that bonds and notes totaled around $340b or over 25 percent of current GDP across 
all governments with an annual interest expense of $17.6b;
•  that the net exposure (Assets less Liabilities) is around 10 percent of GDP;
•  that the liquidity of underlying Assets is unclear, as is the appropriateness of booked 
valuations; 
•  the stated interest repayments for Queensland and NSW are particularly high (with 
deducible interest rates of 6.9 and 5.3 percent respectively) compared to Victoria 
(around 4.7 percent) and the Commonwealth (4.0 percent);
•  Queensland has assets (and liabilities) valued markedly more than those of New South 
Wales and Victoria;
•  that more adequate, consistent and complete reports are needed.
There is no obvious discussion of reducing borrowings in the various reports. Indeed, Queensland 
which is not projecting a surplus (of $0.1b) across the general government sector until 2015-
16 increased its debt by $4.2b in the last year. It is planning to continue capital investments 
of over $10b annually for some years (Queensland Treasury Corporation 2011a). Why State 
debt more than doubled in four years, from $32.1b in 2006-07 to $73.1b in 2010-11, despite 
around $15b from asset sales (ibid) is an unexplained mystery4, as is the lack of discussion of 
such a significant increase in exposure while global conditions were deteriorating markedly.
So, Queensland “is different” but
“Queensland has a long history of setting aside funds to accumulate financial assets sufficient to meet 
future liabilities, the largest being for future employee entitlements, in particular superannuation. 
Queensland is therefore far better placed than other state governments to meet future accruing 
liabilities, as most other jurisdictions have substantial unfunded superannuation and other employee 
liabilities” (Queensland Treasury Corporation 2011b:S 76) 
So what is the real financial health of the States and Commonwealth? It is worth recalling that 
Treasury Corporations are charged with arranging funding for decisions made “elsewhere” 
while Auditors General have adopted relatively narrow audit perspectives. It is unclear which 
agencies, if any, are tasked with reviewing “financial health” and the sustainability of current 
arrangements. There is a clear governance issue here, one neglected by existing agencies and 
in all the talk of tax reform. It seems appropriate that the States and Commonwealth explain 
4  Queensland is expecting to have recent natural disaster costs for the public sector of over $6b over several 
years three-quarters met by the Commonwealth, leaving an exposure of around $1.7b for Queensland. These 
and the timings of some receipts may provide a small part of the story, but they are inadequate explanation 
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their positions more fully, lest investors become concerned. Which of the challenges raised 
by Moody’s in 2009 have been adequately addressed, in Queensland and elsewhere?
“The [Queensland] downgrade reflects the state’s deteriorating financial and debt performance 
and the absence of a medium-term strategy that would over time restore budgetary performance 
and financial flexibility… the state is expected to produce a series of very large, recurring deficits. 
The widening budget gaps and the resulting additional borrowing that is being projected place the 
state on a debt trajectory that is no longer consistent with Aaa debt metrics. Additional budgetary 
pressures could emerge should economic growth be slower than currently anticipated. Queensland’s 
financial performance is also expected to be challenged by the difficulties in reducing operating 
spending following a period of accelerated growth. “ (Moody’s Investor Services 2009).
4.2 On Principles and Practices
A convenient statement of the guiding financial principles adopted by the Australian States 
can be found in the QTC statement to the US Securities and Exchange Commission as part 
of the 2011 supplement to its $20b bond raising (Queensland Treasury Corporation 2011b). 
Since 1992, balance has been sought between assets and liabilities by the Australian States 
(rather than debt repayment). 
The major feature of the new Loan Council arrangements is the switch in focus from gross borrowings 
to an aggregate based on net borrowings as indicated by a jurisdiction’s deficit/surplus. The rationale 
for the switch in focus from global limits to an aggregate based on the deficit/surplus as a measure 
of the financing requirement is that the Global Approach focused on gross new borrowings by 
jurisdictions rather than their net call on financial markets; the latter is a more meaningful indicator 
of the impact of the public sector on the economy (Queensland Treasury Corporation 2011b:S 71) .
But what of the impact of public sector debts on taxes and charges or of the needs for repayments?
The appeal of such an approach to entities that hold the unalienated lands of Australia and 
most of its public physical capital but are revenue constrained is obvious. This position of the 
States contrasts with that of the Commonwealth which holds few physical assets but controls 
large revenue flows and the currency. The latter is a Sovereign with few physical assets. Such 
things make the Australian situation different from that in many other nations. There are policy 
options in Australia that are not generally available, but this is a matter for another paper. 
Of late, State liability undertakings have been principally constrained by the value of assets 
“on the books” rather than by any repayment revenue stream. Indeed the ability to repay a 
loan has become secondary across much of the economy so the States should not be unduly 
criticized for adopting the practice of rolling over loans that became increasingly common 
up until 2007. 
Such  a  strategy  involves  refinance  risk  (Wild  pers  comm  and  as  acknowledged  in 
Queensland Treasury Corporation 2011b): that the “new” funds will not be available at all or 
will be available only at a higher interest rate than anticipated. In the modern economy, the 
former requires a non-diminishing pool of funds while the latter reflects competition for a 
relatively limited pool of funds. As is now appreciated by many, the global pool of available 
funds has diminished since 2007, despite attempts by various central agencies in different 
nations to restore its size.mArk mcgoVErn
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Unless it can acquire or build (considerable) assets, the Commonwealth and its agencies 
need to pay more attention to fiscal balances and debt servicing in the current period. A 
Commonwealth “takeover” of a hospital or education system, for example, would have major 
implications for the balance sheets of the States while potentially allowing some balance sheet 
latitude for the Commonwealth. Seen in this light, calls for the reform of education and health, 
amongst others, may be more about (physical) recapitalization of the Commonwealth after 
years of asset sales from which sadly few returns remain. Local government amalgamations 
and corporatisations offered similar prospects for the States, particular when LGAs which had 
been operating to manage gross debt exposures offered “untapped” assets usable to counter 
increasing liabilities. Clearly such comments are speculative but they do reflect a certain logic.
It is clear that not only are liabilities, specifically debts, high. In terms of the presented 
accounts, assets appear to reasonably match liabilities given current valuations. If so, any 
anticipated problems would be ones of liquidity rather than solvency. That is, the central 
problem is one of achieving appropriate flows of revenues and payments while maintaining 
(or perhaps improving upon) the stock situation.
If however, assets were not realizable at the stated values then solvency problems can arise. 
As evident in Europe, one response is partial or full default on obligations. Through unilateral 
or agreed actions, liabilities are written down to the full or partial cost of other “funding” 
parties. The now less-encumbered party ideally reduces own-liabilities to a “now-serviceable” 
level while also seeking to retain revenues sufficient for essential services. Default crises can 
engender banking crises, or they might prefer a currency crisis?
While sales of assets may be made as part of such processes, problems can be expected 
if revenues foregone imperil the servicing of remaining obligations. Typically it is markedly 
easier to sell assets with good revenue streams so sales of such attractive assets may compound 
problems, as seems to be the case in Queensland and elsewhere. Additionally, contractual 
arrangements can open unanticipated exposures, as with the NSW Waratah trains and the 
threat to the State rating (Wade 2011 Oct 19).
It is at this point that we need to return to the wider world and the possibilities arising as 
crises unfold. 
•  If interest rates rise (strongly), then liabilities may escalate (markedly) due to the 
exposures and linkages demonstrated earlier. 
•  If interest rates fall then liabilities may fall if no refinancing problems arise. 
•  Given the destruction of the global capital stock already there are issues of sufficient 
availability “at all” and “under manageable conditions”.
•  If a debt-deflation were to occur then the States could be quickly squeezed as asset 
values fall while liabilities at least remain. 
•  If inflation were to rise rapidly then monetary policies using rising interest rates could 
be particularly difficult to manage and potentially stagflationary with worsening external 
exposures.
We could go on but sufficient has been said to highlight issues and complexities that need 
proper consideration by those charged with the economic well being of Australia.bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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V. UP A GUMTREE IN A BUSHFIRE? THE AUSTRALIAN DILEMMA
As the fires feeding on years of lush credit growth rage in many parts of the world, Australia 
has been so far only a little affected. Significant exposures exist, however, and these need to be 
assessed and redressed. While no one can know just what blazes will break out next or where, 
prudence mandates risk assessments, readiness, firebreaks and controlled burns. Recovery is 
much more expensive after an unanticipated fire, and some losses are never really replaced. 
As even Kunbul knows, this is not a time to be dreaming up a gum tree. 
A wide-ranging exploration has been presented in this paper in an attempt to understand 
the current “debt dreamtimes” of Australians. The initial focus was on the empirical external 
situation of Australia, particularly its large and growing net external exposure due to expenditures 
exceeding income by around five percent of GDP recently. Net external factor servicing costs 
already account annually for a similar proportion of GDP. Such imbalances already create 
difficulties and might bring on crisis, though this seems not likely yet. 
Current external policies favour a major expansion of mining to lead export growth. 
However, the current mining sector would need to roughly double its exports for Australia to 
stand still externally. It is not only the trade balance that has to be rectified but also the net 
factor income outflows. Given that mining is focused in three States that already have high 
public liabilities, funding further infrastructure becomes even more problematic.
Superficially the Governments of Australia appear in a reasonable position when compared 
to much of the world. Servicing of obligations appear problematic, however, even under 
optimistic scenarios. Closer investigations of positions is clearly warranted. This initial review 
has revealed significant potential vulnerabilities. Adverse conditions externally could lead to 
a rapid deterioration due to refinancing risks while recession would reduce the ability to raise 
sufficient net revenues to service existing obligations. 
A number of domestic factors were also considered, particularly real interest rates which 
have been at historically high levels for years. Such interest rate settings can introduce a range 
of problems with investments, including in infrastructure, and may exacerbate the external 
problem. High interest rate policies targeting inflation may have perverse and potentially 
pernicious effects in an open economy. Improved understanding of interplays in the financial 
account area is needed as a priority.
Current crises can be seen as problems of systemic misallocation, so the framing and 
decision cycles underlying current allocations need to be considered. 
A statement on the current “debt dreamings” of Australians has been presented in terms of: 
•  external exposures of the nation which exceed $800b largely held in Australian dollars 
at the time of writing. National expenditures exceed product which exceeds incomes 
(E > P > I). 
•  direct exposures via Governments. This is large and growing, but largely domestic 
though there is some external liability. 
•  indirect exposures through financial collectives (banks, other financial organisations and 
the financial system). This is both domestic and external, and potentially significant.
Well-informed dialogues and skilled responses will be needed before current problems are 
satisfactorily resolved. Australia will indeed be a lucky country if it can achieve this without mArk mcgoVErn
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crises, major capital losses or austerity. There are ways through (as discussed elsewhere) but 
actions need to be taken before current windows of opportunity close. 
Three areas that particularly need attention are:
•	 Defusing	stresses	and	reducing	exposures.	Currently Australia faces particularly 
uncertain times while carrying a large external exposure. The way this exposure is held 
and renewed (much was 90 day debt in late 2010, for example) needs to be carefully 
investigated and well managed. The national excess of expenditure over income needs 
to be reversed in an effective, timely manner.
•  Policy	 rebalancing.	 Policy  assumptions  about  external  flows,  the  attainment  of 
balances and interest rates need revisiting and reconsideration. Thinking about money, 
finance and the real economy needs to be reconnected, and broadened. Uncertainty 
and investment basics need incorporation into more adequate conceptualisations and 
models of the open economy. More immediately, further raising of real interest rates 
appears counter productive and might expedite crisis.
•  A	rejuvenated	dreaming? “We” need to think more adequately about our world and the 
possibilities we generate. Existing thinking and conventions have lead to foundational 
crises, not superficial ones. At heart is a misallocation problem, with a spurious solution 
of “more debt” adopted. We need to both reframe our thinking and allow dynamic 
considerations of the mutual engagements that strengthen societies and economies. 
Much needs to be done and properly focussed efforts need to be initiated to restore a proper 
foundation for national prosperity.
Generational understandings can be rendered obsolete, and potentially destructive, in a 
perhaps surprisingly short space of time. The turnaround in debt servicing conditions between 
1970 and 1980 investments provides but one example. One of the problems this causes is for 
relevance in both informal education, as in a family, and more formal education. Something 
learned in 2000 might be obsolete, inaccurate or otherwise inadequate today – even in the 
absence of crisis. Crisis just makes irrelevance of some particular knowledge or conventional 
wisdoms that much more likely, and the risks in using it higher. 
Appropriate regrounding needs to occur both routinely and strategically if apt decisions 
are to be made. Arguably, this becomes particularly important if policy becomes more founded 
on management or political perspectives rather than some principled analytics, as occurs in 
any move from enlightenment to entitlement. Some major changes will be needed if we are 
to move beyond the mire of the Debt Dreamtime. 
In that more ancient Dreamtime, why was the world turned upside down? Why did the 
Rainbow Serpent intervene? While not understanding the context or the relatively slight nature 
of the insult, the Serpent did not seek a fuller appreciation, made a cursory judgement based 
on superficial reasoning, allowed escalation and then imposed his will in ways which seem to 
this reader as out of all proportion to the original (and subsequent) transactions.
“… all the flying foxes gathered round old Kun-man-gur the Rainbow Serpent to thank him for his 
help. Kun-man-gur flashed his forked tongue and smiled. … bEyond thE AustrAliAn dEbt drEAmtimE: rEcognising imbAlAncEs
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‘This country belongs to us, now that Kunbul and his friends have run away’ said Ninji. But old 
Kun-man-gur shook his towering head. … 
When they reached the riverbank, old Kun-man-gur cut down a piece of hollow bamboo. This he 
filled with all the flying foxes, including Warlet and Ninji. … Then he dragged the piece of bamboo 
and his fishing net to the bottom of the river. 
 ‘All day you can stay down here with me.’ Kun-man-gur bubbled. ‘When the flowers come out, 
I will free you so that you can eat them… You may feed all night. But at dawn you must always 
return to me.’” (Cowan 2000)
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